Thursday, 5 June 2014

Israel and Iran in the Irish Times

The Irish Times recently published an interview with Iran's ambassador in Dublin.  The mere fact of such exposure will have thrown the (unusually hysterical and aggressive) Israeli embassy in Dublin into a considerable tizzy.

So a letter to the Irish Times by the Israeli embassy's (Irish) press officer, Dr Derek Flynn, was inevitable.   I replied to his letter, but my letter was not published.   Here's my reply:


June 2, 2014

Dear Sir
 
Dr Derek O'Flynn takes issue with the words of the Iranian Ambassador (letters, 2/6/14). But sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. Dr O'Flynn says Iran attacks Israel at every international forum, but Israel regularly threatens to bomb Iran literally.  Dr O'Flynn drags up one nearly-mythical speech by a former Iranian president, but it is misquoted: Mr Ahmedinijad (aggressive and dictatorial as he was) called for the end of the 'Zionist regime' and that the 'occupying regime' be 'wiped off the map' - 'occupying' referring to the Occupied Territories - not quite the same thing as calling for Israel to be wiped out. 

Iran is at least a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and has never threatened to use nuclear weapons, unlike Israel, which threatened their use against Syria during the Yom Kippur war of 1973. Iran has not occupied another people's territory for the last 46 years, illegally colonising that territory, imprisoning and murdering that people, despoiling their resources. Iran commits many human rights infractions, but it is not an ethnically-defined state, where one ethnic group is constitutionally prioritised over all others. It does commit torture on dissidents, but so does Israel torture Palestinian prisoners - see the reports of the Public Committee against Torture in Israel. 

Dr O'Flynn accuses Iran of exporting terror all over the world, but this really is good for a laugh: Israel has exported weapons and expertise to murderous regimes all over the planet, including those of Amin in Uganda and Mobutu in Zaire, Guatemala in the 1970s and 1980s, and apartheid South Africa. Israel was eager to install the murderous Lebanese Phalange in power in 1982. Most hilariously of all, Israel actively exported weapons to the brutal regime of the Shah in pre-revolutionary Iran, and even exported weapons and spare parts to the Islamic Republic during its war with Iraq. 
 
Some sauce, Dr O'Flynn?

yours sincerely
Conor McCarthy

Israeli diplomats apparently regard a posting in Dublin as being akin to being sent to one of the outer circles of Hell.   We need to confirm them in that impression.

Conor

Wednesday, 14 May 2014

The Catastrophe

May 14: Anticipating Nakba Day

On May 15, 1948, Israel declared its 'independence', and the new Jewish state was born.  War was already underway in Palestine, with the struggle increasing in intensity in the early spring of 1948.  In March of that year, the Jewish guerrilla groups had adopted 'Plan Dalet', a blueprint for an offensive across all of Mandate Palestine, with the initial objective of forcing corridors and passages between the areas allotted to the Zionist movement under the terms of the UN Partition Plan of November 1947.  The fragmentary Palestinian forces and leadership, weakened and lacking experience and equipment since the great revolt of 1936-1939, collapsed under Haganah pressure, and the ethnic cleansing of Palestine began.  'Defenders of Israel' who like to point out that the new state was invaded by Arab armies on the day of its independence tend to forget that by May 15, 1948, 250,000 Palestinians had already fled the Mandate territory, driven out and terrorized by massacres such as that at Deir Yassin (also written as Dayr Yassin) in April of that year.

Over against the official memory of Israeli 'independence' (I am always rather mystified as to exactly what it was that Israel was declaring its independence from - the Ottomans were gone, the British were leaving, and no Arab alternative was capable of emerging), the Palestinian communities assert their counter-memory of 'an-nakba' - the catastrophe. Between the voting through of the Partition Plan at the UN in late 1947, and the eventual armistice in early 1949, an estimated 700,000 - 800,000 Palestinians left their homes in fear or at gunpoint, or in terror of real or rumoured slaughter.  The Zionist exultation at winning a territorial state is shadowed by the grief, exile, longing, fury, humiliation and chaos of the Palestinian dispersal. The Whiggish Israeli story contains within itself, as its dark and bloody condition of possibility, the grim and disastrous Palestinian story.   Edward Said used to point out how the success of the Zionist 'narrative' had been its capacity to interdict, in both the most brutally literal manner as well as as in the lofty realm of ideas, the Palestinian 'narrative', and in fact actually to erase its territorial ground.

One of the features of the emergence of the Israeli 'New History' in the 1980s was its edging of an Israeli account of what happened in 1947-1949 much closer to accounts that had long been given by Palestinian historians of the Nakba. One of the most distinguished of those historians was Walid Khalidi.  Khalidi's masterpiece is an epic and wrenching book entitled All That Remains - a painstaking gazetteer, complete with maps and photographs, of every one of the more than 400 Palestinian villages which were cleansed, evacuated, and eventually bulldozed and destroyed by Israel at this time.  The Guardian has published an 'interactive map', which chillingly illustrates the logic of this process of clearing Palestinian communities over this period, in a succession of simple and effective maps.  It's worth looking at, as we prepare ourselves for the windy rhetoric of official Israeli celebrations:

The Arab villages lost since Israel's war of independence - interactive 

Verso is one of the Anglophone world's best leftwing publishers, with a good record of putting out valuable books on Israel/Palestine.  Here is a Nakba reading list, from the Verso site:

Nakba Day: A Reading List



 Conor

Monday, 5 May 2014

Peter Matthiessen and the Selous: The End of the Game

Last autumn, I was fortunate enough to spend nearly two weeks in southern and western Tanzania.  I was on safari, in the backcountry.  I visited two reserves or areas: Ruaha National Park, which is in the west of the country, and the Selous Game Reserve, which is in the south.   I flew to Dar es Salaam via Qatar, and then by small planes into the bush.

This was high-end travel, and expensive and cosseted.  Nevertheless, it was utterly enthralling.  Being there fed an enthusiasm that runs deep into my life.  I've been fascinated by East Africa and its fauna since I was a very young child.  My mother, with very little money to her name, acquired a cheap record player of a kind that was popular at that time - it looked like an overnight bag, which split into a half which contained the speaker, and a half which contained the turntable.  The first record she bought me was entitled Sounds of the Serengeti.  It was a series of animal recordings made by Graham Dangerfield, and featured a voice-over commentary by Sir Peter Scott, the first director of the World Wildlife Fund.  And so it was replete with lions roaring, and eating, and elephants flapping their ears, and hyaenas giggling and whooping, and the sound of thousands of wildebeest fording the Mara River during the 'great migration' which takes place every year over the plains of the Serengeti and the Maasai Mara.  I adored it all.

Later, I devoured articles in National Geographic magazine, about lions, hyaenas, wild dogs, gorillas, chimps.  Though I did not fully understand it at the time, these pieces, published at the end of the 1960s and into the early 1970s, were the results of important fieldwork by a group of mostly American students and proteges of Louis Leakey, the great English-Kenyan paleoanthropologist associated with the excavation of Olduvai Gorge: Dian Fossey, Jane Goodall, Hans Kruk, and, perhaps preeminently, George Schaller.  I got a secondhand copy of Bernhard Grzimek's wonderful and ultimately heartbreaking account of the first aerial census of the Serengeti, Serengeti Shall Not Die.  I read books by Schaller, Goodall, Hugo von Lawick, and Myles Turner, the first warden of the Serengeti.

In my middle teens, other interests took over - militaria, the world of Tolkien, music, girls.  I never seriously considered a career in zoology or biology. But the old fascination never altogether disappeared.  In 1978, I won a school prize for academic performance, and with the book token awarded, I bought a book from Hodges Figgis on St Stephen's Green (the building was more recently the headquarters of the ill-fated Anglo-Irish Bank): The Snow Leopard.  The author was an American, Peter Matthiessen.  The book remains one of the finest accounts of friendship between men and of travel in the wild.  It tells the story of Matthiessen joining George Schaller, who by the middle 1970s had moved his research into the high mountains of Central Asia, on a journey from Nepal over the Himalayan watershed, and into the remote Dolpo region of Tibet.  Schaller was at the time conducting studies of Himalayan blue sheep, one of the main prey animals of snow leopards.  For a while, Schaller was reckoned to be the only Westerner ever to have seen a snow leopard in the wild.  Matthiessen never sees a snow leopard - they are exceptionally elusive and shy creatures.  But, partly because the book is also suffused with Matthiessen's allegiance to and exploration of Zen, the metaphor of the search widens out in the richest way in the account of the journey.

Subsequently, I began to learn that Matthiessen was already an established and important American writer, not only on nature and travel, but also of fiction.  Yet I had found him at a crucial moment: The Snow Leopard won the American National Book Award in 1979, and consolidated his reputation.   He had been part of a group of American writers, including George Plimpton and William Styron, who gravitated to Paris shortly after the Second World War.  There, he was one of the founders of the Paris Review, a notable American literary magazine. He was also, briefly, recruited by the CIA, to keep an eye on his left-leaning colleagues.  This sleazy episode came properly to light only much more recently, unlike the capers of the Congress of Cultural Freedom and the corrupt funding of Encounter - originally exposed by, among others, Conor Cruise O'Brien.

Matthiessen began to write about wildlife and wilderness in the late 1950s.  Non-fiction sometimes fed into his novels.  In 1961, he published The Cloud Forest, about his travels in the Amazon basin; some years later, he published the novel At Play in the Fields of the Lord, a Conradian drama about the depredations of American power and proseletyzing in Latin America.  He had a knack for being in the right place at the right time: in 1971, he published Blue Meridian, which documented his time with Peter Gimbel, and Valerie and Ron Taylor while they were filming one of the great wildlife documentaries, Blue Water, White Death, about great white sharks.  The Taylors would be hired some years later by Steven Spielberg to shoot live footage of sharks for Jaws.

In 1972, Matthiessen published the first book in his African trilogy, The Tree Where Man Was Born, a brilliant and lyrical account of his travels in East Africa in the 1960s.  In 1981, he published Sand Rivers, an account of a long journey on foot into the southern interior of the Selous Game Reserve.  In 1991, Matthiessen published African Silences, a grim catalogue of travels in Western and Central Africa, documenting eroding wildernesses and disappearing animals.   It was because of Sand Rivers that I wanted to see the Selous.

The Selous is surely one of the world's great wilderness treasures.  It's an enormous reserve,. at least three times the size of the Serengeti, indeed nearly the size of Ireland or Switzerland in land area.  It contains an astonishing variety of landscapes and flora - jungles, savannah plains, miombo woodlands, the massive and magnificent Rufiji river and its tributaries.  It contains a vast amount of wildlife. And it has never featured on the tourist routes in the way that the Serengeti, equally extraordinary but hugely popular, up in the north of Tanzania abutting the border with Kenya, has done.

Wildlife preservation and tourism is a very big deal in Tanzania, perhaps more than in most African countries.  Tanzania has allocated approximately 25% of its land surface to game reserves of one kind or another.  When I first visited Tanzania some years ago, I was fascinated to learn that not only are there 'national parks', of which the Serengeti is maybe the most famous and greatest example, but also 'game reserves', private conservation areas, conservation areas run by local communities and tribal groups, and so on.  These different formations bring with them different levels of wildlife protection, different access and usage by human beings.  All around the borders of the Serengeti National Park, where animals are protected entirely, where humans cannot camp or farm or bring their cattle, are other forms of - usually less restrictive - preservation.  I stayed in an area in the north-east of the Serengeti plains, called Loliondo.  The 'Loliondo concession' is an area administered by the Maasai, and in it some hunting is permitted, on license.  It is a spectacularly beautiful and fertile region, even by the prodigious standards of the Serengeti.

The Selous is a 'game reserve'.  This means that in 80% of its administrative 'blocks', licensed 'big game' hunting is permitted.  Wealthy Europeans and Americans come to the Selous to hunt the 'big five' - elephants, rhinos, lions, leopards, and buffalo.  To the animal-loving westerner, this may seem unfortunate.  But practically, the revenues from big game hunting have been ploughed back into the reserve, and have helped its administration and preservation.  The Selous's real difficulties, and they are various and severe, lie elsewhere.

Three main problems afflict the Selous.  The first and most immediate of these is poaching.  In the earlier twentieth century, the Selous contained one of the largest concentrations of elephants on the continent of Africa.  In the 1970s, poaching reduced this population drastically.   New management procedures were brought in, and the population rose again, up to 70,000 or 80,000.  But the 1990s, the global economic boom, the explosion of the Indian and Chinese economies, and the penetration of multiple African economies by China in particular, have brought with them a return of elephant poaching on a catastrophic scale.  While it is true that the Selous is and feels like a wilderness of the grandest order, it is also surrounded by rural Tanzanian populations - farming and trading communities, where poverty remains rife.  It is very hard to justify to an impoverished farmer the access to the Selous of some wealthy European to kill an elephant, while denying it to the locals.  Furthermore, a couple of good tusks are worth many months' income to poor Tanzanians, even at their bottom end of the hugely lucrative ivory trade.  In conditions like these, and in a territory so vast as to be almost impossible to police closely, poaching is inevitable.   A survey taken in the Selous last autumn, starting only weeks after I was there, has revealed that the Selous elephant population may now be as low as only 13,000.  Remedial action is essential.

Another problem the Selous faces is the wish of successive governments in Dar to tap the hydroelectric potential of the Rufiji in the northern Selous, specifically at Stiegler's Gorge, a dramatic rocky defile hundreds of feet deep. When I was there in September, traces of previous surveys and investigations made with a view to damming the Gorge could be seen.  Any such dam would completely alter the character of the northern Selous, and quite likely destroy or severely damage its ecosystems.

The last problem is in some ways the most alarming.   In recent years, a pairing of Russian and Canadian mining companies has found uranium deposits, just outside the southwestern corner of the Selous.  At a meeting of UNESCO in Moscow in 2012, the Tanzanian government sought and won a derogation allowing it to cut off a small area of the Reserve to facilitate the uranium development while retaining the Reserve's UNESCO World Heritage site status.  Not merely this, but it is entirely unclear what measures will be taken or can be taken to prevent radioactive waste leaching or blowing into the areas surrounding the mine, including the whole of the Selous.  It's estimated that the mine workings will necessitate the removal of an overburden of tens of millions of tons of soil and rock, bringing roads, quasi-industrial development, transient labour, deep into the wild country.  The potential for uncontrollable and unimaginable damage to the Selous, indeed to much of southern Tanzania, appears thus far not to have been taken seriously into consideration.

It is easy for a Westerner like me to romanticise a place like Selous.  Visiting it feels like viewing a primordial landscape that has never been marked by human and historical processes.  Of course, this is not true: the Selous is as much a product of human culture and political action as anywhere.  Its origins lie in the 1890s, when Germany was the colonial power in Tanganyika.  It was initially a private hunting reserve, but was both expanded and opened to the public over the twentieth century.  The shunting aside of local populations, or the denial to them of farming and hunting lands, was a concomitant of the Reserve's establishment and growth.  The Selous is not an innocent place.  This does not mean, however, that it's not now an extraordinary and unique region, a jewel in the crown of global landscape and wildlife preservation.

The protection of rare and spectacular ecosystems, like those of the Selous, is never easy.  Too often, the human relationship with nature appears to be one founded in domination - enclosure, primitive accumulation, the impoverishment and peonage of rural populations and the aggrandisement of new bourgeoisies and international elites, the tampering with native species, the fostering of bland and unhealthy monocultures, the insouciant rape of extraordinary landscapes and cultures in the pursuit of temporary wealth.  The Selous faces enemies formidable, ugly, crass and determined. 

Peter Matthiessen died on April 5.  He was 86.  He had lived a long and interesting life, and indeed a long and illustrious writing life.  Though he considered himself primarily a novelist, it seems likely that it's for his travel and nature writing that he will be remembered.  In this respect, he stands as a notable figure in a very great American tradition stretching from Henry David Thoreau to Gary Snyder and Barry Lopez, while also extending the purview of that lineage to other countries and terrains.   He would have been concerned and sad at the present straits in which the Selous Game Reserve finds itself, though he'd not have been surprised.  For all his pastoral lyricism and Hemingwayan courage, Matthiessen  never extended the 'enormous condescension' of the liberal western metropolis to the embattled countries and peoples of the global south about which he so often wrote.  But he would add his name to those rallying to defend the Selous: to preserve for a better future its ochre hills and plains, its startling woodlands, its evanescent washes and 'sand rivers', and its wildlife - its gaunt and magnificent elephants, its amber-eyed lions, its huge herds of heavy-horned insolent buffalo, its shimmering, kaleidoscopic birdlife. Here are the last words of Sand Rivers:

A cool wind out of the south; we head downstream.  A herd of impala, the emblematic antelope of Africa, springs away over the green savannah, and as we pass, the great milky-lidded eagle owl eases out of a thick kigelia and flops softly a short distance to another tree, pursued by the harsh racket of a roller.  Already tending north-northwest towards its confluence with the Luwegu, the river unwinds around broad sand bars and rock bends, and wherever it winds away toward the east, the man called Goa cuts across the bends, following the river plains, the hills, the open woods, and descending once again to the westward river.


Conor


Thursday, 24 April 2014

Ukraine: Empire and Crisis

The Ukraine crisis rumbles on.  Russia's involvement in eastern Ukraine is apparent at many levels: pressure on the new government, the likely use of special forces as agents provocateurs in spawning the take-overs of public buildings and police installations, the alleged build-up of military units on the border.

In addition to the basic fact that the new Kiev government is unelected, the element that is missing - and it's a pretty large element - in so much Western reportage of what is happening is the American/EU/NATO context or framework.  The way the issue is reported nearly always suggests, mostly by what is not said, that 'we', or the West, or major Western institutions and alliances, have had no hand in the escalation.  This simply is untrue.  The part played by NATO and the United States may be different from that played by Russia, but it is substantial, and understanding the situation requires a sense of that involvement and complicity.  Here are two pieces by distinguished writers, first published on CounterPunch.

Patrick Cockburn is a younger brother of Alexander Cockburn, and one of the most distinguished foreign and war correspondents alive.  He is not a leftist in the way his brother was, but he is clear-eyed, brave, and writes as well as Alexander did.  In particular, his coverage of the Iraq invasion, wars and occupation have been brilliant, but Patrick also served as a Moscow correspondent for the London Independent back in the 1990s.  This background serves him well now:

Ukraine: From Crisis to Catastrophe


Arno Mayer is one of America's most distinguished historians.  Now professor emeritus at Princeton, he has authored two particularly famous books.  The Persistence of the Ancien Regime is an account of what the French Revolution left untouched, and of the forces of reaction which survived it.  Why Did the Heavens Not Darken? is one of the greatest and most devastating accounts of the Holocaust.   Here he is on Russia, Ukraine, and the West.

The Ukraine Imbroglio and the Decline of the American Empire



Conor


Badiou on Ukraine

Alain Badiou is one of France's greatest living philosophers.  Of the generation of the famous structuralists and poststructuralists (Foucault, Deleuze, Derrida), Badiou seemed - at least in the English-speaking world - for long to be overshadowed by them.  But in recent years his reputation has soared, and the amount of his work being translated into English has grown exponentially, including materials reaching back to his early and primary writings.  This work includes books on ontology, mathematics, politics, political activism and drama.

Badiou, though now retired, continues to write seriously and to speak out fearlessly.  Particularly refreshing is the fact that he has never disavowed his far-left positions, and so now stands out in the morass of contemporary French philosophy and political activism for his intransigence and integrity (though in a context dominated by the likes of Bernard-Henri Levy - memorably described by Perry Anderson as a 'crass booby' - it might be hard not to).  Here is an article from the Verso website, where he discusses insurrection in regard to Ukraine, amongst other places:

Tuesday, 18 March 2014

Russia, Ukraine, Crimea

The crisis in Ukraine and the Crimean peninsula is one of the most dramatic and alarming confrontations since the end of the Cold War.  The struggles in the former Yugoslavia were prolonged and horrendous.  Russia's wars against Chechnya and Georgia have been bloody - quite extraordinarily so in the former case.  But the manoeuvres and geopolitical jostling underway at the moment are on a much larger scale, with much more at stake.

Russia is historically an empire, and its approach to its sphere of influence was matched in the policies and positions of the Soviet Union, and is echoed now again in the Russian Federation - Russia is a very large and strong state that seeks to maintain zones of influence, geopolitical freedom of movement, and buffering between it and other powerful countries and blocs.  For Russia, this was, at least in part, the geo-strategic logic of the 'communist' regimes of eastern Europe and the military alliance that held them together after 1955: the Warsaw Pact.  But with the collapse of the USSR, the WP also melted away.  Russia underwent a brutally rapid and chaotic transition to market capitalism during the 1990s, with ferocious terms prescribed to it by the World Bank and the IMF.  Russia under Vladimir Putin has succeeded, primarily via its hydrocarbon resources, in achieving a somewhat healthier economy, and a renewed sense of its great power role. 

But Russia's shambolic and sometimes violent emergence from the ruins of the USSR has not always been aided or made easier by Western powers.  The terms of integration of the Russian economy into the global capitalist economy have been very poor.  Western powers have done little to discourage the shocking oligarchical economic structures of corruption and power that Russia has developed.  And the West, led by the United States, has foolishly and unthinkingly maintained the NATO alliance, and pressed it very close to Russia.  It is an unattractive but necessary fact that part of the Ukraine/Crimea crisis has stemmed from the wish of Western powers to push the NATO alliance deep into Russia's traditional zones of influence - its 'near abroad', as represented not only in the Baltic states and Poland, but also in Ukraine.  The late Peter Gowan predicted the force and seriousness of the Russian reaction to Western influence in Ukraine as long ago as 1999.

To say this is not in any way to deny that the Russian regime is deeply undemocratic, corrupt, and authoritarian.  But one cannot understand what is happening in Ukraine, Crimea and Russia at the moment purely in ethical-moral terms.  This is not simply a struggle over democratic values and human rights, but needs to be understood in the terms of machtpolitik

This blog has often expressed respect for and interest in the work of John J Mearsheimer.   Mearsheimer is a professor of international relations at the University of Chicago, and he is the author of The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.  In this book, Mearsheimer sets out a chilling vision of post-Cold War global politics, simply sweeping away any illusions of a stable 'New World Order'.  Mearsheimer's angle of vision of the international system is called, in his own terms, 'offensive realism'.  By this, Mearsheimer means that the best way to understand the international system is to see it as constituted by perpetual Hobbesian struggle between states for power.  These struggles, which involve even small states like Ireland, are dominated, of course, by the 'great powers'.  These struggles are not always limited or contained by economic relations or international law.  Russia is a former great power, seeking to recover its role in the world.  Its quest to do so is not always pretty.

Mearsheimer's perspective is valuable not because he is a radical leftist, much as this blog might wish at times that he was.  It's valuable because Mearsheimer is, in a way that is rare in the American foreign policy establishment, almost entirely unsentimental.  He is not necessarily interested in the plight of the weak,  and he  is not above advocating for the interests of the United States, but he cuts through the diplomatic and policy-theoretical verbiage and pious hypocrisy that passes for public wisdom in the halls of power in Washington, London, Brussels, Paris and Berlin.  Here  he is in the New York Times on March 13 last, on the current crisis:

Getting Ukraine Wrong - NYTimes.com

For some background on Vladimir Putin, and the way in which he's steered Russia over the last decade, one could hardly do better than to read Perry Anderson.  Anderson is surely one of the most impressive and formidable Anglophone Marxist intellectuals alive.  An early editor of the New Left Review, Anderson (born in Waterford, and brother of Benedict Anderson, a leading scholar of nationalism), has taken part in many of the most important  debates in Western Marxism since the Sixties.  With Tom Nairn, he offered a powerful diagnosis of British politics in the 1960s, arguing that unlike other major European countries Britain has never experienced a 'bourgeois revolution'.  This led him into dramatic and famous politico-theoretical clashes with EP Thompson, which were also exacerbated by the fact that Anderson and his NLR colleagues represented a heavily 'continental' strain in British Marxism, indebted to thinkers such as Gramsci, Sartre, Althusser, the Frankfurt School writers, and Lucio Colletti, whereas Thompson's positions reflected his training as a positivist historian.  But Anderson's range has always been astonishing.  Still a young man, he produced two magnificent historical syntheses in 1974 - Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism, and Lineages of the Absolutist State - and a series of short volumes tracking British and European Marxism which are masterpieces of pithy interpretative summary.  More recently, he has produced wonderful volumes in the history of ideas - A Zone of Engagement and Spectrum - and a massive study and critique of the idea of Europe - The New Old World.  Anderson frequently writes for the London Review of Books, and even there his stylish, mordant and sinewy essays stand out for their acuity, erudition and the sheer pleasure they offer the reader.  He wrote a long essay on Putin and Russia in 2007, which still stands up very well.

Russia’s Managed Democracy: Why Putin? · 25 January 2007


Conor

Tuesday, 18 February 2014

From South Africa to Israel: The long-delayed death of Sharon

Following on from what I was writing about here in December, it's tempting to head this post 'from the sublime to the ridiculous'.  But the truth, as this blog sought to argue, is that Mandela was not altogether 'sublime', and Sharon was much too formidable and dangerous to be merely 'ridiculous'.  Nevertheless, the contrast was striking.

This blogpost is, unfortunately, well too late to offer anything properly dramatic on Sharon.  But it's worth noting again a few salient facts about him, most especially from the standpoint of the Palestinians.  That he was a bullish, aggressive, gifted soldier (wounded in combat at Latrun in combat with the Arab Legion in 1948, and the leader of the Israeli break-out and victory in the Sinai Peninsula that swung the October War of 1973) is not to be doubted.  That he was capable of some degree of political manoeuvre is also clear.   But we need - amidst the oracular waffle of writers like Denis Staunton at the Irish Times ('Sharon's authority and courage much needed now') and journals like The Economist  ('He may be missed') - to think Sharon 'from the standpoint of [his] victims', to adopt Edward Said's Lukacsian formulation, and to remember that he was never less than fully motivated by the doctrine of the 'iron wall' and its variants.

The idea of the 'iron wall' was propounded by the founding ideologue of the Israel Right, Ze'ev Jabotinsky, in the 1920s.    With steely clearsightedness, Jabotinsky cut through the liberal or 'socialist' Zionist hypocrisy which either ignored the presence of the Palestinians on the land, or talked vaguely about 'co-existence'. Jabotinsky made it clear that the Zionist project was one predicated on force and might: Israel would survive if it created an 'iron wall' of military power against which the Arabs would break, like so many waves, or which could shatter them.  Only if the Arabs became firmly convinced that they would never defeat Israel would the Zionist project attain stability and peace.  Avi Shlaim has argued for some time that this has been the core element of Israeli policy vis-a-vis the Arab world for all Israeli governments since 1948, whether those of the 'left' or the right.  This was Sharon's approach, right through his career.

It must be admitted that early in that career, Sharon was an army officer, and not making policy as such.  But, going back as far as his leadership of the notorious Qibya raid and massacre of 69 Palestinian civilians in 1953, we can see the lineaments of the 'iron wall' policy: Qibya was, after all what the British Empire used to call a 'punitive raid' - an overwhelming 'reaction' to a 'provocation' (Palestinian 'infiltration' - often only Palestinian peasant farmers trying to return to their lands from which they'd been cut off by partition in 1947-49) by mere 'natives'.  Even in the context of the IDF, Sharon was a controversial figure who sometimes disobeyed orders, as at Mitla Pass during the Suez War of 1956.  By the time the Likud had come to power in 1977, he was a politician similarly capable of deviousness and insubordination, and, as Defence Minister, he undersold the purposes of 'Operation Peace for Galilee' - the invasion of Lebanon in 1982 -  to his cabinet colleagues almost until IDF armoured columns had surrounded Beirut. 

The Israelis had long nursed a relationship with the most reactionary forces among Lebanon's Maronite population, and armed and equipped the Phalange gunmen whom Sharon allowed Elia Hobeika  to send into Sabra and Chatilla refugee camps in September 1982, to clean out 'terrorist nests'.  That this was allowed after the Palestinian forces had left Beirut for Tunis, and just after the assassination of the Phalange's leader, Bashir Gemayal, shows that Sharon was either culpably negligent or bent on facilitating the slaughter that then took place.  Meanwhile, as documented by Robert Fisk and Jonathan Randal, among others, the IDF sealed off the camps and fired flares into the night skies to illuminate the ferocious butchery underway.  Up to 3500 Palestinian and Lebanese civilians - mostly women and children and the elderly - were killed.

Peace protests in Israel, and the dismayed reaction amongst Israel's allies, were not enough initially to embarrass Sharon into resignation or Begin into firing him.  Eventually he stayed on in cabinet as a minister without portfolio.  Israel appointed the Kahan Commission to investigate the killings.  Meanwhile an international commission was assembled to investigate Israeli breaches of international law during the war.  It was chaired by Sean MacBride, and featured amongst its members Kader Asmal and Richard Falk.

The Kahan Commission found that the IDF bore indirect responsibility for the massacres, given that it held the area.  The killings were found to have been carried out by Phalangist units, but with the knowledge and approval of both Sharon and Begin.  It also found that Sharon bore direct responsibility for 'ignoring the danger of bloodshed and revenge [and] not taking appropriate measures to prevent bloodshed'. It recommended Sharon's dismissal as Defence Minister. The MacBride commission found that 'the government of Israel has committed acts of aggression contrary to international law', that the government of Israel had no valid reasons under international law for its invasion of Lebanon, and that the Israeli authorities or forces were directly or indirectly responsible for the massacres and killings.

In any normal democracy, this would have been the end of Sharon's career.  But, in spite of the protestations of its supporters, Israel is not a normal democracy, and Sharon stayed on in Likud.  Eventually he became Housing Minister in 1990.  This was when 'the Bulldozer' became the particular darling of the settlement movements.  In 1998, in the middle of the Oslo 'peace process', by which time he was Foreign Minister, he would address a meeting of the rightwing Tzomet party, in the following terms:

Everybody has to move, run and grab as many hilltops as they can to enlarge the settlements because everything we take now will stay ours ... everything we don't grab will go to them.

Sharon's nickname, 'the Bulldozer', of course illustrates what his supporters most liked about him: not only his massive personal bulk, his formidable presence on the Israeli political scene, but also his brutal toughness, and his willingness to endorse the programme of incremental conquest and ethnic cleansing that the settlement project in truth is.  Those journals, like the Irish Times and the Economist above, which like to see Sharon as a 'pragmatist' or as 'realistic' like to point to his dismantling of the Sinai settlements constructed during Israel's tenure of the peninsula between 1967 and 1982, and his 'disengagement' from the Gaza Strip, as evidence of his capacity for 'flexibility'.  However, these actions do not really weaken the argument for Sharon's ideological vigour and ruthlessness: the Sinai withdrawal - merely a belated compliance with Security Council Resolution 242 - was from territory that was of relatively minor strategic and ideological worth to Israel, and Gaza even more so.  Furthermore, the payoff for the Sinai withdrawal was a peace treaty with Israel's most populous and militarily formidable Arab rival, effectively removing the threat of a serious co-ordinated Arab offensive against Israel.  And the payoff for the unilateral and un-negotiated Gaza disengagement was the support of the Bush administration for Sharon's plans for the West Bank.  Further again, though Israeli settlers are gone from the Strip, it is still technically under occupation, as it has no sovereignty over sea or air, and does not control its own borders.  Nothing in these developments detracted from Sharon's project of 'politicide', to use the neologism coined by the late Israeli sociologist, Baruch Kimmerling.  Kimmerling's point was that while Sharon was not necessarily wedded to achieving a genocide of the Palestinians, he was most certainly committed to their politicide, by which Kimmerling meant the extirpation of the Palestinians as a political movement or as a collective political agent, the end of their rights as a national community, the separation of Palestinian subjects from any relation to the land of Palestine by right, the denial to them of 'permission to narrate' their national story.

The point of all of this is to show that Sharon, while capable of making tactical manoeuvres whether on the battlefield or in politics, must nevertheless be seen as he was: a ruthlessly tough colonial warrior, firmly convinced of his own rightness, of the ideology of the 'iron wall', of the need for as little compromise as possible, of the superiority of Jewish Israelis to Arab Palestinians in every respect, and casually indifferent to the sufferings of his victims.  The bottomless cynicism of Western pundits who declare that he'll be 'missed' needs to be recognised as itself a more polite and diplomatic version of the same crass arrogance and Eurocentrism.  Good riddance to him.

Avi Shlaim, emeritus professor at St Antony's College, Oxford, and one of the Israeli 'New Historians', wrote an honest estimation of Sharon for the Guardian

'Man of peace'? Ariel Sharon was the champion of violent solutions

Conor